⛓️💥 The credential isolation angle is worth a closer look. An agent's API key is usually provisioned the same way a human's is. Same scope. Same expiration. Same audit trail. But an agent doesn't use credentials the way a human does. It chains them. It calls API A to get data, then uses that data to call API B, then uses both to call API C. The attack surface is the chain, not the individual key. Current tooling audits keys. It doesn't audit chains. ⛓️💥
100% - secrets at large need to be completely re-imagined for this agentic world. I've also see agents pass along keys to one another. Agent A has access to secret A, delegates part of a task to Agent B and hands over the secret too. From an audit trail it look like A did all the work, but that isn't true... You're absolutely right, it's the audit trail (and authZ along that trail) that will matter. Amongst many other problems!
Exactly. The deeper issue is that bearer tokens can't tell you who's presenting them. If Agent A hands its key to Agent B, the API just sees a valid key for A. It has no reliable way to know B made the call. So the fix probably isn't better secret storage by itself. Agents need non-transferable credentials: scoped delegation, token exchange, proof-of-possession, and audit trails that preserve the chain of authority.
Excellent breakdown of the control vs. autonomy tradeoff. The continuous authorizaton model is critical but I dunno if most security teams realize how much it shifts the burden from policy definition to policy evaluation at runtime. We're basically asking RBAC to become context-aware at machine speed which is a huge archietctural leap for most orgs.
You're absolutely right. I also think a derivative implication of this, is the need to apply policy in an automated manner, in response to context signals. Humans struggle to compose - in the best of times - fine grained authZ policies. The world of agents will make that almost impossible to be handled by humans.
⛓️💥 The credential isolation angle is worth a closer look. An agent's API key is usually provisioned the same way a human's is. Same scope. Same expiration. Same audit trail. But an agent doesn't use credentials the way a human does. It chains them. It calls API A to get data, then uses that data to call API B, then uses both to call API C. The attack surface is the chain, not the individual key. Current tooling audits keys. It doesn't audit chains. ⛓️💥
100% - secrets at large need to be completely re-imagined for this agentic world. I've also see agents pass along keys to one another. Agent A has access to secret A, delegates part of a task to Agent B and hands over the secret too. From an audit trail it look like A did all the work, but that isn't true... You're absolutely right, it's the audit trail (and authZ along that trail) that will matter. Amongst many other problems!
Exactly. The deeper issue is that bearer tokens can't tell you who's presenting them. If Agent A hands its key to Agent B, the API just sees a valid key for A. It has no reliable way to know B made the call. So the fix probably isn't better secret storage by itself. Agents need non-transferable credentials: scoped delegation, token exchange, proof-of-possession, and audit trails that preserve the chain of authority.
Excellent breakdown of the control vs. autonomy tradeoff. The continuous authorizaton model is critical but I dunno if most security teams realize how much it shifts the burden from policy definition to policy evaluation at runtime. We're basically asking RBAC to become context-aware at machine speed which is a huge archietctural leap for most orgs.
You're absolutely right. I also think a derivative implication of this, is the need to apply policy in an automated manner, in response to context signals. Humans struggle to compose - in the best of times - fine grained authZ policies. The world of agents will make that almost impossible to be handled by humans.